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We study the effect of enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil, an economy with a large 
informal sector and strict labor law. Enforcement affects mainly the degree of compliance 
with mandated benefits (severance pay; health and safety) in the formal sector; and the 
registration of informal workers. We find that stricter enforcement leads to higher 
unemployment but lower income inequality. We also show that, at the top of the formal 
wage distribution, workers bear the cost of mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. 
This is not true at the bottom, because of downward wage rigidity. As a result, formal 
sector jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution become more attractive, inducing the 
low skilled self-employed to search for formal jobs. 
 
JEL Classification: J21, K20, H00, H10, L50, O17 
Keywords: mandated benefits, enforcement labor regulations, labor informality, 
employment and inequality 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the suggestions of seminar participants at the World Bank, IFAU, the 
Stockholm School of Economics, Alicante, the OECD Development Centre, the 2007 IZA/World Bank 
Conference on Labor Markets, the 2007 EEA Meetings, the 2008 SOLE meetings, Universidade Catolica 
Portuguesa, especially those of Joe Altonji, Mariano Bosch, Miriam Bruhan, Carlos Corseuil, Per-Anders 
Edin, Francisco Ferreira, Martin Floden, Richard Freeman, Miguel Gouveia, David Kaplan, Chinhui Juhn, 
Adriana Kugler, Lars Ljunqvist, Joao Cesar das Neves, Amil Petrin, David Robalino, Stefano Scarpetta, 
Luis Serven, Rodrigo Soares, and Kathy Terrell. We thank the Brazilian Ministry of Labor for providing 
the data on enforcement of labor regulation and important information about the process of enforcement, 
especially Edgar Brandao, Sandra Brandao and Marcelo Campos. We are also very grateful to Adalberto 
Cardoso for valuable insights on the enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil. Renata Narita provided 
excellent research assistance in this project. Juliano Assuncao, Joana Naritomi and Rodrigo Soares kindly 
provided city level data on the quality of institutions. Carneiro gratefully acknowledges the financial 
support from the Economic and Social Research Council for the ESRC Centre for Microdata Methods and 
Practice (grant reference RES-589-28-0001), from ESRC grant RES-000-22-2805, and the hospitality of 
Georgetown University, and the Poverty Unit of the World Bank Research Group. This paper also 
benefited from financial support from a World Bank research grant. Corresponding author: Rita Almeida, 
1818 H Street, NW, Washington DC, 20433. Email: ralmeida@worldbank.org    1 
 
1. Introduction 
A large fraction of the labor force in the developing world operates in the informal market. Any 
study  of  employment  or  inequality  in  these  countries  needs  to  distinguish  employment  and 
earnings in both the formal and informal sectors. Therefore, it is striking that most empirical 
analyses  of the  effects  of  labor  market  regulation  are either  based  on  a  single  labor market 
model, or on the assumption that regulation only affects the formal sector. 
In this paper we study the impact of increased enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil, a 
country where more than 40% of all workers are informal. In Brazil, enforcement is best seen as 
affecting the provision of mandated benefits in formal jobs (severance pay, health and safety), 
and the formal registration of informal workers. We focus on the effects of enforcement on the 
employment and earnings of multiple types of workers, namely formal and informal employees, 
and self-employed workers. We show that a one standard deviation increase in enforcement is 
related to: a 6% increase in the share of the population in formal employment; a 6% increase in 
non-employment; a 10% decrease in informal employment; an 18% reduction in formal wages; a 
20% increase in earnings of those who are self-employed; and an overall reduction in inequality. 
There is little change in the employment and wages of those who are informal employees. 
  When reading these results it is important to consider a model of the labor market with 
multiple  and  interdependent  sectors,  which  is  standard  in  the  theoretical  literature  on  labor 
markets in developing countries. The results in the previous paragraph suggest that even if labor 
market reform has direct impact only in the formal sector, it will strongly affect workers outside 
of the formal sector because of linkages across markets. As a consequence of an increase in 
mandated benefits in the formal sector (making formal sector jobs more attractive), and of an 
increase in the cost of employing unregistered workers, there is a shift in employment from the 
informal and self-employment sectors to the formal sector. Formal sector wages decline, because 
the higher level of mandated benefits passes through to worker salaries in the form of lower 
wages. Earnings for the self-employed rise, due to a decrease in labor supply to that sector. 
Wages and employment of informal employees are largely unchanged, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that these workers operate in a segmented market, shielded from the rest of the 
economy.  The  rise  in  non-employment  may  be  a  consequence  of  a  general  increase  in   2 
employment costs. However, in the presence of search frictions in the formal sector, it may also 
result from an increase in the attractiveness of formal jobs, which brings more individuals to 
search for a job in that sector.  
Our  study  was  made  possible  by  our  assembly  of  a  new  dataset  containing  labor 
inspections for each city in Brazil. The main empirical challenge we face comes from the fact 
that  inspections  are  not  likely  to  be  randomly  distributed  across  cities.  For  example,  low 
compliance with the law is bound to attract more inspections. Similarly, the existence of better 
institutions  in  the  city  could  foster  better  quality  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law,  and  more 
compliant individual and firm behavior. In order to minimize these problems, we collect data on 
two  determinants  of  enforcement:  the  distance  between  each  city  and  the  nearest  regional 
enforcement office, and the number of labor inspectors in each state. We explore the fact that 
distance  to  the  nearest  enforcement  office  is  likely  to  be  a  more  binding  constraint  to  the 
enforcement activity in states where the supply of labor inspectors is smaller. Therefore, in a 
regression of a labor market outcome on enforcement, we use the interaction between distance 
and the (log of the) number of inspectors (per firm) in each state to instrument the degree of 
enforcement in each city, after controlling for polynomials in distance and state fixed effects, as 
well as a very rich set of city level controls (some of which are also interacted with state level 
characteristics). In our data, the interaction between distance and the number of inspectors is a 
strong predictor of enforcement in each city.
2 
Our  identifying  assumption  could  be  violated  if  those  cities  which  are  far  from 
enforcement offices are also small, rural, and remotely located, and if states with a large number 
of inspectors engage in active regional policies favoring small and remote cities. Our data does 
not support these concerns. In particular, we show that the interaction between the number of 
inspectors  in  the  state  and  distance  from  each  city  to  the  nearest  enforcement  office  is 
uncorrelated with the quality of institutions, the quality of the social infrastructure, the amount of 
state transfers received, the size of the population and its income, the industrial structure, and the 
levels of past informality, inequality and poverty in each city. It is also likely that the decisions 
                                                 
2 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use a similar procedure to analyze the relationship between financial development and 
growth, by examining how sectors with different degrees of financial dependence are affected by the degree of 
financial development in each country. Similarly, there is a large literature studying the effects of trade reforms that 
compares their effects across sectors with different exposure to foreign competition (Goldberg and Pavnick, 2003).   3 
on regional policy and on the enforcement activity (namely number of inspectors per state) are 
made by different institutions, and possibly at different administrative levels (state vs. federal). 
The paper contributes to a long literature. The theoretical framework on which we draw 
upon follows Harberger (1962), Harris and Todaro (1970), Fields (1975, 2005), MacDonald and 
Solow (1985), Bulow and Summers (1986), Acemoglu (2001), Maloney (2004), and Albrecht, 
Navarro and Vroman (2006).
3 Although labor regulation is strict in Brazil, there is surprisingly 
large  wage  and  employment  flexibility (e.g.,  Barros  and  Mendonca, 1996,  Barros,  Cruz  and 
Mendonca, 1997). The reason for this may be low enforcement. Therefore, when interpreting our 
findings  we  think  of  a  model  with  minimal  rigidities,  except  for  frictions  in  the  job  search 
process in the formal sector. More recent contributions to the literature on informality include 
work by Schneider and Enste (2000), Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000), 
Amaral  and  Quintin (2005), Galiani  and  Weischelbaum  (2007),  Boeri  and  Garibaldi  (2006), 
Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2005), de Paula and Scheinkman (2006), Bosch, Goni and Maloney 
(2007), and World Bank (2007). Especially related to us is the study of inequality in economies 
with dual labor markets, such as Fields (1979, 2005), or Bourguignon (1990). 
Modern  surveys  of  the  role  of  labor  market  institutions  include  Layard  and  Nickell 
(1999), or Kugler (2007), among many others. The increasing availability of micro data lead to 
the emergence of several studies examining the effect of labor market regulations in developing 
countries, such as Kugler (1999, 2001, 2004), Kugler and Kugler (2003), Eslava, Haltiwanger, 
Kugler and Kugler (2006), Ahsan and Pages (2007), Petrin and Sivadasan (2006), or the studies 
in Heckman and Pages (2004). Two papers are especially close to ours. Besley and Burgess 
(2004) explore within country (district level) and across time variation in labor reforms in India 
to study the effect of labor regulations on productivity, investment, employment and poverty. We 
explore a very different source of institutional variation, and use labor market data disaggregated 
at the city level. Marrufo (2003) examines the consequences of the reform of social security in 
Mexico, using a Harberger model with two employment sectors and worker heterogeneity. This 
paper is one of the few that considers labor market policy in a multi-sector labor market. 
Finally, we relate to the large literature on the labor market effects of mandated benefits 
(Summers, 1989, Lazear, 1990), both in the U.S. (e.g., Gruber, 1994) and in developing countries 
                                                 
3 Several papers try to empirically distinguish different models of the labor market (segmented and non-segmented). 
See e.g., Dickens and Lang (1985), Heckman and Hotz (1986), Maloney (1999), Filho, Mendes and Almeida (2004), 
Navarro-Lozano and Schrimpf (2004), Bosch and Maloney (2006), Almeida and Bourguignon (2006).   4 
(e.g., Gruber, 1994, 1997, Kugler, 2005, MacIssac and Rama, 1997). Relatively to the literature, 
our model allows the informal sector to respond to changes in mandated benefits. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide background information 
on  the  Brazilian  labor  market,  its  institutions,  and  the  structure  of  the  enforcement  process. 
Section 3 presents the simple theoretical framework that guides our work. Section 4 describes the 
data.  Section  5  explains  the  empirical  strategy.  Section  6  shows  the  empirical  results,  and 
discusses the main lessons for labor markets in developing countries.  Section 7 concludes.   
2. Labor Market Regulation and Enforcement in Brazil  
2.1 Labor Regulations  
At least on paper, Brazil has one of the least flexible labor market regulations in the world. The 
law establishes that all employees must have a work permit where the employment history of the 
worker is registered (carteira de trabalho). This permit entitles the worker to several benefits, 
such as a retirement pension, unemployment insurance, and severance payments. The labor code 
is largely written into the Brazilian constitution, which makes any amendments very difficult. 
The constitution of 1988 introduced several changes to the labor code which increased the degree 
of worker's protection (see e.g., Barros and Corseuil, 2001). For example, the law establishes that 
the maximum work period is of 44 hours a week, the maximum period for continuous shift work 
is 6 hours, minimum overtime pay is 1.5 times the normal hourly wage, paid leave is at least 4/3 
of the normal wage, paid maternity leave is 120 days, and the employer must contribute monthly 
to  social  security  and  to  a  job  security  fund,  the  FGTS.  This  a  fund  administered  by  the 
government, employers and employees, which accumulates while the worker is employed by the 
firm. The employer must contribute monthly with 8% of the employee's current wage to the fund 
(10% from 2001 onwards).
4 Adding up all the costs, in order for a worker to receive a net wage 
of Reais 100, the firm needs to disburse approximately Reais $165,7 (Cardoso and Lage, 2004).  
Firing a worker in Brazil is not significantly more difficult than firing a worker in other 
Latin American countries, although it is definitely more costly. Employers must give advance 
                                                 
4 As a consequence the accumulated FGTS of a worker in a given firm is proportional to its tenure. Only workers 
that are dismissed for an unfair reason or those that are retired have access to this fund. Workers can also use their 
FGTS in exceptional circumstances like when buying a house or paying large health expenses. Upon dismissal, 
workers have access to the entire fund, including all the funds accumulated in previous jobs, plus a penalty in 
proportion to the fund accumulated during the tenure in the last firm.    5 
notice to workers and, in the interim period, workers are granted two hours a day to search for a 
job. This period is never smaller than one month and recently it became proportional to the 
worker's tenure. During this period, employers cannot adjust the worker's wage. This implies that 
approximately 25% of the paid hours (2 out of 8 possible hours in each working day) are not 
worked.  Due to a drop in motivation, the productivity of a dismissed worker also falls once he is 
given notice of dismissal so the overall decline to production is likely to be above 25% (Barros 
and Corseuil, 2001, argue that the fall in production is near 100%). Workers who are dismissed 
at will have the right to receive compensation paid by the employer, over and above what was 
accumulated in the worker's job security fund (FGTS). In particular, the law establishes that a 
penalty equal to 40% of the fund accumulated during the worker’s tenure with the firm is due to 
the worker.
5 Therefore, dismissal costs increase with the duration of the work contract. One 
obvious perverse effect of such high severance pay is that several workers force their dismissal, 
potentially increasing turnover rates, and increasing the firm’s costs (see, e.g., Neri, 2002).  
There is one final aspect that should be emphasized: severance payments received by the 
worker are not subject to income taxation (this is not true in most countries). This means that 
workers value one Real of FGTS more highly than one Real in gross salary. Moreover, firms pay 
taxes on profits which can add up to more than 30%. As a result the cost of FGTS to the firm is 
much smaller than the value of FGTS to the worker. 
2.2. Enforcement of Labor Regulations 
Firms weight the costs and benefits of complying with the strict labor regulation. They may 
decide  to  hire  informally,  or  to  hire  formal  workers  without  complying  fully  with  specific 
features of the labor code (e.g., avoid the provision of mandatory health and security conditions, 
or avoid payments to social security). The expected cost of evading the law is a function of the 
probability  of  being  caught  and  of  the  monetary  value  of  the  penalties  (fines  and  loss  of 
reputation). In turn, the probability of being caught depends on firm characteristics (such as size 
and legal status)
6 and on the degree of enforcement of regulation in the city where the firm is 
located. Compliance with labor regulation in Brazil is enforced by the Ministry of Labor. Given 
                                                 
5 This charge was elevated to 50% after 2001 (outside our period of analysis), with the additional 10% going directly 
to the government. For a period after 2001, the FGTS contribution was also raised from 8 to 8.5%. 
6 Cardoso and Lage (2007) argue that the integration of firms in international trade and the need to comply with 
international quality standards (e.g., ISO certificate) implicitly forces firms to comply with regulation. For example, 
it is often the case that firms who which to export need to prove their compliance with labor regulations and cannot 
resort to any forms of child labor or slavery.    6 
the size of the country, enforcement is first decentralized at the state level (the state level labor 
office is called delegacia) and then at a local level, the subregion (the local labor office is called 
subdelegacia). A subdelegacia is located in a city, but its catchment area generally includes more 
than one city (or municipio). In each state, the delegacia is always located in the state capital and 
the number of subdelegacias within the state is a function of the size and economic importance 
of each region. For example, the state of Sao Paulo has 21 subdelegacias while other smaller 
states, like Acre or Amapa, only have one subdelegacia, which coincides with the delegacia.  
Labor inspections were probably of little relevance during the 70’s and 80’s. In the late 
80’s  the  Brazilian  economy  had  several  hyperinflation  episodes  and  this  contributed  to  a 
significant depreciation of the nominal value of fines. However, during second half of the 90’s 
labor  inspections  gained  importance.  Several  reasons  are  behind  this.  On  one  end,  labor 
regulation became stricter after the 1988 Constitution. One the other end, the strong government 
deficit in the mid 1990s lead the government to search for alternative ways to collect revenue, 
and labor inspectors started being used as tax collectors. Their main goal was to collect job 
security contributions which helped reduce the  size of the government  deficit, at least in an 
accounting sense (since they cannot be used directly by the government to fund its expenditure). 
It was probably only after this change that labor inspections gained prominence. 
Inspectors are affiliated with a especific subdelegacia but, to deter corruption, they must 
periodically  rotate  across  subdelegacias.  The  maximum  period  an  inspector  can  stay  in  one 
subdelegacia  is  twelve  months  (Cardoso  and  Lage,  2007).  In  theory,  an  inspection  can  be 
triggered either by a random firm audit, or by a report (often anonymous) of non-compliance 
with the law. Reports can be made by workers, unions, the public prosecutor’s office, or even the 
police. In practice, since the number of labor inspectors is low relatively to the number of non-
compliance reports, most inspections are triggered by these anonymous reports. Inspectors assess 
the  compliance  of  each  inspected  firm  with  several  dimensions  of  labor  law  (e.g.,  worker's 
formal registration, severance pay, minimum wage regulation, hours of work). Almost all of the 
targeted firms are formal firms because it is difficult to visit a firm which is not registered, since 
there are no records of its activity. As a result, an enormous fraction of informal employment is 
left out of the inspectors’ reach. Inspectors have a performance based pay scheme. In particular, 
up to 45% of their wage is tied to the efficiency of the overall enforcement system (1/3 is tied to 
the inspectors own performance while 2/3 is tied to the system’s global performance). Their base   7 
salary is also fairly competitive. In 2004, their monthly wage was between USD 2,490 (starting 
position) and USD 3,289 (top management).  
When faced with violations of the labor code, inspectors must immediately notify the 
firm. The firm then has 10 days to present evidence in its defense. After that period, the process 
is re-examined by a different inspector from the one issuing the fine, who deliberates about its 
fairness, and the result is reported to the head of the subdelegacia (subdelegado).  If firms do not 
contest the fine and pay it within 10 days of their notification, there is a 50% discount on the 
amount of the fine. Alternatively, if firms file an appeal, they must deposit the total value of the 
penalty until a second decision has been reached. In practice, small and medium firms pay the 
fines early to take advantage of the discount. Larger firms, with their own legal departments, 
tend to refute the deliberations, and often avoid the payment of any fines. Fines can be either 
fixed, or indexed to firm size and profitability. For example, a firm is fined by Reais 446 for each 
worker that is found unregistered during an inspection. Depending on its size and profitability, if 
a firm does not comply with the mandatory contributions to the FGTS, then it can be fined an 
amount between Reais 16 and Reais 160 per employee.
7 
Although the number of inspectors was relatively low in the early 2000s when compared 
with a decade before, inspectors were able to reach a significant part of the total labor force in 
formal firms in Brazil. In 2002, 304,000 firms were visited by labor inspectors, reaching more 
than 19,000,000 workers (Cardoso and Lage, 2007). Of these, approximately 17% of the firms 
received a notification of non-compliance with the law, but less than 3% of the workers were 
registered,  a small number  given that 50% of  employment is informal in Brazil. This could 
reflect the fact that informal workers are concentrated in small and informal firms outside the 
reach  of  labor  inspectors,  but  it  may  also  suggest  that,  among  the  different  types  of  labor 
violations,
8 formalization is not the sole (or even the main) target of the inspections. According 
to Cardoso and Lage (2007), the main target for labor inspectors is the lack of payment of the job 
security fund and compliance with health and safety conditions on the job. The evidence in table 
                                                 
7 Cardoso and Lage (2007) argue that the magnitude of the fines is quite reasonable to work as a deterrent to crime, 
and that the main problem is their enforcement. 
8 All violations are punishable with fines. Inspectors issue fines for the non-registration of workers, disobedience of 
the official work period or hours worked, non-compliance with the mandatory wage payments (including minimum 
wages), missing FGTS contributions or health and safety violations. It is useful to note that fines may be inaccurate 
measures of enforcement for two reasons. First, we only see a fine if a violation is detected, and much enforcement 
may have a deterrent effect not translated into fines. Second, inspectors avoid issuing fines, and try to first negotiate 
with the firm non-litigious ways to solve the illegality they observe (Cardoso and Lage, 2007).   8 
A1 also supports this. When looking at different types of fines issued by inspectors in 2002 three 
categories comprise 75% of the total number of fines: registration, FGTS, and other types of 
violation (including heath and security violations). .  
The Ministry of Labor makes an effort to apply homogeneous criteria for enforcing labor 
regulation throughout the country (e.g., by providing training and using similar software) but, in 
practice, this is very difficult to achieve because the country covers a very large and diverse 
geographical  area.  Inspectors  are  also  probably  very  heterogeneous.  Moreover,  they  have  to 
travel different distances and face varying workloads depending on where they are located. This 
will give rise to substantial regional variation in the degree of enforcement across cities, which 
we explore econometrically.  
3. Theoretical Background  
In interpreting our findings we consider a multi-sector model of the labor market. We do not 
develop a  full model since there is a  rich literature we can draw on,  namely  Lewis (1954), 
Harberger  (1962),  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970),  Fields  (1975),  MacDonald  and  Solow  (1985), 
Bulow and Summers (1986), Acemoglu (2001), Maloney (2004), Albrecht, Navarro and Vroman 
(2006),  Bosch  (2007).  Suppose  that  there  is  a  formal  sector,  an  informal  sector,  and 
unemployment.  In  the  formal  sector  the  wage  is  higher,  but  there  is  risk  of  unemployment 
because of (search) frictions. In the informal sector there is no unemployment, so the wage is 
lower. Workers are free to choose in which sector to operate. On the labor demand side, firms 
decide to hire either formally or informally. The cost of hiring formal workers is their wage, in 
addition to payroll taxes and mandated benefits. The cost of hiring informal workers is their 
wage plus the potential penalty the firm has to pay if caught hiring this type of workers. 
Our  empirical  work  supports  two  small  additions  to  this  simple  framework.  First, 
following some authors we introduce duality within the informal sector (e.g., Fields, 1990, 2005, 
Maloney, 2004). While it is true that there is a group of informal workers who could be working 
in the formal sector if that was their choice, there is another group which operates in a segmented 
labor market, queuing for a formal sector job (as in the more traditional view of the informal 
sector;  e.g.,  Dickens  and  Lang,  1985).
9  Second,  in  the  absence  of  asymmetric  information 
                                                 
9 In the empirical work we will not be able to rigorously distinguish between upper and lower tier informal workers. 
However, there is a suggestion in the literature that informal wage earners belong in the lower tier, while part of   9 
between  workers  and  firms,  wage  rigidity,  or  credit  constraints,  mandated  benefits  (such  as 
severance pay, or health and safety on the job) are borne by workers in the form of lower wages, 
and have no effects on employment. While these assumptions may hold at the top of the wage 
distribution, they are unlikely to be true at the bottom, which will lead us to see some effects of 
mandated benefits on employment (e.g., Summers, 1989, Mitchell, 1990, Lazear, 1990). 
What are the consequences of an increase in enforcement in this simple model? We start 
by assuming that enforcement focuses only on the compliance with mandated benefits in the 
formal sector. One simple way to model this is to assume full compliance with mandated benefits 
in the formal sector, and to equate an increase in enforcement with an increase in the size of 
amount of the mandates. In this case, we expect a contraction in the labor demand curve because 
formal workers become more expensive. We also expect an expansion of the formal labor supply 
curve, since formal jobs become more attractive. If the cost of mandated benefits to the firm was 
equal to their value to the worker, and if there were no wage rigidities, then the equilibrium wage 
in the formal sector would decrease by an amount equal to the cost of the mandated benefits, 
with no change in formal employment (Lazear, 1990), and no change in the informal sector. This 
case  is  depicted  in  figure  1  which  plots  demand  and  supply  to  the  formal  (DF  and  SF)  and 





Several empirical papers estimate the extent to which payroll taxes and mandated benefits 
translate into lower wages to be quite large (e.g., Gruber, 1994, 1997, Marrufo, 2001, Kugler, 
2005, Heckman and Pages, 2003).
10 At the bottom of the wage distribution, it is likely that the 
pass-through rate is below 100%, because downward wage rigidity is limited. At the top of the 
wage distribution, it is possible that it is close to 100% (or even higher), especially  for job 
severance pay since workers can easily gain access to the job severance fund. Furthermore, it 
could be above 100% if: i) firms pay taxes on profits but workers do not pay taxes on severance 
payments (this is the case in Brazil), which means that for each Real the worker receives as 
severance  pay  (net  of  taxes)  the  firm  needs  to  disburse  less  than  one  Real;  ii)  the  costs  of 
                                                                                                                                                             
self-employed workers are likely to be in the upper tier (e.g., Bosch and Maloney, 2006). Table A3 in the appendix 
gives mixed evidence on this. While the assumption that the self-employed are at the upper tier of the informal 
sector looks reasonable for those at the top of their wage distribution, it does not for those at the bottom, who earn 
even less than the poorest informal wage earners. These are probably street merchants or individuals in similar 
occupations. 
10 Heckman and Pages (2003) estimate rates of pass-through close to 90% in OECD countries, while Marrufo (2001) 
and Kugler (2005) have estimates closer to 60-80% for Mexico and Colombia. Gruber (1994, 1997) stands out for 
estimating 100% pass-through rates, for the US (maternity benefits) and Chile (payroll taxes).   10 
providing better health and safety conditions on the job are below the value workers place on 
them. This case is shown in figure 2 where, for simplicity, we assume there is no change in the 
demand for informal labor. In principle, the equilibrium demand curve for informal labor in an 
economy with enforcement will be above the original curve, since the equilibrium formal wage 
is below the original wage. 
If pass-through rates are either above or below 100%, then labor supply in the informal 
sector will be affected. Low wage jobs in the formal sector become more attractive if wages do 
not adjust to an increase in mandated benefits: informal workers may be willing to leave their 
jobs to search for a new job in the formal sector, even if they risk of unemployment. If the risk of 
unemployment increases substantially (because of a contraction in labor demand due to higher 
labor costs), then informal employment could rise: those searching for work in the formal sector 
could decide to take up employment in the informal sector. High wage jobs in the formal sector 
may become more or less attractive to informal workers depending on their valuation of the new 
mandated benefits, and the rates of pass-through to wages. Finally, in this scenario, wages are 
likely to decline in the formal sector. Wages in the informal sector may increase or decrease 
depending on whether there is an expansion or contraction in the labor supply. 
Suppose  now  that  enforcement  affects  only  worker  registration.  Firms  are  urged  to 
reclassify their informal workers as formal (under the penalty of being fined), and then comply 
with social security, payroll, or severance payments. In this case, an increase in enforcement 
translates into an increase in the cost of hiring informally, and a contraction in the demand for 
informal workers. The result would be a shift in employment from the informal to the formal 
sector, and a decline in wages in both sectors. This is shown in figure 3 in a very simplistic way, 
since we do not allow the full equilibrium effects to take place in the figure (we keep the demand 
for formal workers and supply of informal workers fixed). 
In  this  simple  competitive  model,  enforcement  is  always  distortionary  and  welfare 
reducing. More generally, the welfare implications of increases in enforcement are mixed. The 
standard view is that taxes and mandates impose distortions and reduce welfare. However, if 
formal  jobs  are  intrinsically  more  productive  than  informal  jobs,  there  may  be  a  role  for 
promotion of formality (Acemoglu, 2001), as long as it does not involve pure reclassification of   11 
workers doing the same job. Similarly, if workers are credit constrained, mandated benefits such 
as severance payments may be welfare enhancing (Alvarez and Veracierto, 2001).
11 
4. Data  
The paper explores several sources of data. First, we use administrative data on the enforcement 
of labor regulations (in 2002), collected by the Department of Inspections at the Ministry of 
Labor for our project. This data contains information on the number and location of regional 
labor offices, number of inspected firms, number of fines issued in each city, and number of 
inspectors per state. Our measure of enforcement is the log number of inspections in each city 
(plus one) minus the log of the number of firms in the city (log inspections per firm in the city). 
Second, we compute several city level labor market indicators using the 10% sample of 
the  Brazilian  population  census  in  2000,  containing  detailed  information  on  labor  market 
outcomes for 15 million individuals. In particular, we compute the share of workers who are 
registered, unregistered, or self-employed, the share of non-nemployed, average wages for each 
type  of  worker,  and  measures  of  income  and  wage  inequality  in  the  city  (including  several 
percentiles of the income and wage distributions, and the city 90-10 income and wage ratio). We 
also compute similar statistics for individuals in different gender, age and education  groups. 
Table  A2  reports  the  proportion  of  the  adult  population  in  each  employment  category.
12 
Registered  and  unregistered  wage  earners,  self-employed,  and  non-employed  individuals, 
together account for 87% of the adult population.
13 Therefore, in the empirical work we focus on 
these  four  groups.  Informal  employment  and  self-employment  are  considered  two  separate 
categories, as emphasized in the recent literature (Maloney, 2004, Fields, 1990, 2005). Finally, 
we have also computed some measures of past informality, poverty and inequality in the city 
                                                 
11  Several  authors  consider  non-competitive  models  of  the  labor  market,  in  which  firms  have  some  sort  of 
monopsony power. In these models mandated benefits can increase the bargaining power of workers, allowing them 
to increase their total compensation package (e.g., Saint-Paul, 1995, Ljunqvist, 2002). As a response, there can be an 
increase in the wage of informal workers to keep them indifferent across sectors. 
12 In the 2000 Census, each individual is classified into one of the following 10 categories: registered domestic 
worker, unregistered domestic workers, registered wage earner, unregistered wage earner, employer, self-employed, 
unpaid apprentice, unpaid employee (usually in family business), working for self-consumption, and without status 
(or not employed). 
13  The  remaining  13%  are  formal  and  informal  domestic  employees  (0.8%  and  2.5%  respectively),  employers 
(1.5%), interns or apprentices (0.1%), unpaid employees (3.5%), and individuals working only for self-consumption 
(4.6%). These individuals are excluded from our analysis. These are small groups of the population and unlikely to 
be too much affected by changes in enforcement.   12 
using  the  1980  Brazilian  census.
14  All  city  level  variables  are  computed  using  population 
weights. In 2002, there are 5,513 cities in Brazil. 
Third, we use detailed information on other city level characteristics from two statistical 
and  research  institutes  in  Brazil  -  Instituto  de  Pesquisa  Economica  Aplicada  (IPEA),  and 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).
15 In particular, we collect information on 
the city’s GDP per capita (2000), total number of firms (2000), average firm size (2000), share of 
agriculture in GDP (2000), share of manufacturing in GDP (2000), share of services in GDP 
(2000),  geographical  city  characteristics (including  geographical  area,  altitude,  longitude  and 
latitude), city transportation costs (1995), total federal transfers to each city (1990), the city head 
count poverty index and the city Theil inequality index. The total number of firms (2002) in each 
city comes from the Cadastro Central de Empresas, collected by IBGE, which only includes 
formal firms. We also use past city level variables published by IPEA for the years 1970, 1980, 
and 1991, including city population, per capita income, average years of schooling and share of 
population in urban areas. Because some of the cities in 2000 did not exist in the 70’s, 80’s or 
even 1991, we use the more aggregate definition of minimum comparable unit (MCU), published 
by the IPEA, to obtain an estimate of these city variables in previous years.
16 For all cities in a 
given year, we know to which MCU each city was previously mapped into. Then, we computed 
the average value of each variable for each MCU (weighted by population size in each city), and 
assigned it to each city in the MCU.  
Fourth, we use information on the institutional development of the city, published by 
IBGE, used in Naritomi, Soares and Assuncao (2007), and kindly provided by the authors. These 
measures include an index of the access to justice in the city, an index of managerial capacity in 
the city and an index of political concentration in the city (based on a Hirshman-Herfindhal 
index of the shares of the political parties). The index of managerial capacity in the city measures 
the  quality  of  local  administration,  and  is  used  by  the  Ministry  of  Planning  to  monitor  the 
administrative performance of cities. Access to justice measures the penetration of the rule of 
                                                 
14 In the 1980 Census there is no information on the whether the worker has an official work permit. Instead, the 
survey collects information on whether the worker makes social security contributions. Hence, in 1980 the definition 
of informal worker differs from the one used in 2000. In 1980 a worker is considered informal if he/she do not make 
any social security contributions. We expect the two definitions to be correlated, since almost no unregistered 
workers pay social security contributions. 
15 These statistics are publicaly available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br and http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/.  
16 In 1970 and 1980 there existed 71% and 72% of the cities that existed in 2000, while in 1991 there existed 82% of 
the cities in 2000.  A MCU is an area (set of cities) which is defined in such a way that can be compared over time.   13 
law, in particular the existence of courts or justice commissions in the city. We also consider 
state aggregates of these variables, by averaging across cities.  
Fifth, we compute the distance and travel time (by car) between each city and the nearest 
subdelegacia in the state. The transportation of inspectors from the subdelegacia to each firm is 
made using ground transportation, usually car. Hence, the enforcement of labor regulation will 
be easier and less costly the closer a subdelegacia is from the city where the firm is located. We 
construct a measure of the accessibility of inspectors to firms by using the travel time from each 
city to the nearest subdelegacia within the state (minimum distance). Data on travel times and 
travel distances between any two Brazilian cities is available from one of the largest Brazilian 
auto insurance companies (BB), which collects very detailed information on distances across 
cities.
17  When firms are located in cities that have a subdelegacia the measure assumes the value 
zero. We also construct the distance between each city and the capital city within the state. In the 
remaining of the paper we focus on travel time as the most relevant measure of distance. A third 
measure of the remoteness of the city, or of its access to markets, is an index of transportation 
costs between each city and the nearest capital city taken from IPEA (1995). Sample statistics for 
the main variables we use are presented in table 1. 
5. Empirical Strategy 
Our main empirical specification is the following: 
)    (            u   η   δX   βE α  Y ij j ij ij ij 1 + + + + =  
where Yij is the outcome of interest in city i and state j, Eij is enforcement in city i and state j, Xij 
is a vector of city level controls,    j η  is a state fixed effect, and uij is the residual.  β  is the 
parameter of interest and measures the impact of enforcement on labor market outcomes. The 
main outcomes we consider are the share of informal workers in the city, poverty, inequality and 
unemployment, and earnings and employment of formal, informal, and self-employed workers. 
Enforcement is measured with the logarithm of the number of inspections per firm in the city 
(computed as the number of visits by labor inspectors plus one, divided by the number of firms). 
                                                 
17 This information is available online at www.bbseguroauto.com.br. When collecting information on distances. We 
have faced two obstacles First, could not find information online for those cities that have only recently been 
recognized as cities. In these cases, we have located the closest nearby city (using maps) and used that information 
instead. Second, most on the cities in Amazonas use the maritime rather than the ground transportation both for 
goods or persons. Hence, the travel distance by car is meaningless for this state and, hence, we have excluded it 
from the analysis.   14 
Estimating equation (1) using ordinary least squares would produce biased estimates of β 
since  ij E  is potentially correlated with uij. Two main reasons are behind this. First, enforcement 
may be stricter in cities where violations of labor law are more prevalent. This could happen 
because inspections are triggered mainly through reports of illegal activity. Second, enforcement 
may  be  stricter  in  cities  where  institutions  are  better  developed.  In  order  to  overcome  this 
problem, we collect data on two determinants of enforcement: the distance between each city and 
the nearest regional enforcement office, and the number of labor inspectors in each state. Then 
we explore the fact that distance to enforcement centers is likely to have different effects on 
enforcement depending on the available number of inspectors. In particular, distance will be a 
greater constraint to the enforcement activity in cities where the supply of labor inspectors is 
smaller, and therefore it should have a disproportionately large effect on enforcement (and labor 
market outcomes) in states where the number of inspectors is low.  
We use the interaction between distance and the number of inspectors (per firm) in each 
state as an instrument for the degree of enforcement in each city, while controlling for distance 
and state fixed effects, in addition to a very rich set of city level controls (some of which are also 
interacted with state level characteristics, as explained in the next paragraph).
 State fixed effects 
account for the fact that states with different numbers of inspectors per firm may also be different 
in  other  dimensions,  while  distance  to  the  nearest enforcement  office  accounts  for  the  non-
random location of enforcement offices. Any remaining variation is given by the differential 
effect of distance across states with varying numbers of inspectors.
18  
We include as additional controls several city level characteristics: income per capita, 
population size, average schooling, and share of the population living in urban areas in 1970, 
1980 and 1991,  city  latitude,  longitude,  altitude  and  area,  and  two  measures  of  institutional 
development in the city, taken from Naritomi, Soares and Assuncao (2007). Finally, one could be 
concerned that the number of state level labor inspectors is simply correlated with other state 
level characteristics, like its level of development or institutional quality which interacted with 
distance could also affect the city level outcomes of interest. Therefore we include in the reduced 
                                                 
18 A similar identification procedure is used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who examine the effect of financial 
dependence on growth, or Goldberg and Pavnick (2003), who study the effect of trade reform on informality. 
Several difference-in-difference strategies (and other grouping estimators) account for location and time effects and 
implicitly instrument the variable of interest with the omitted interaction between location and time (e.g., see Meghir 
and Whitehouse, 1995).   15 
form  equation  the  interaction  between  distance  to  the  enforcement  office  and  other  state 
characteristics: the log of the average of per capita GDP in the state between 1970 and 2000, and 
measures of city level institutions averaged at the state level (access to justice, governance and 
political concentration). Other controls are distance to the state capital and log of transportation 
costs to the nearest capital interacted with the four variables above, and with the log of the 
number of inspectors per firm in the state.  
Figures 4 and 5 show the intuition of our procedure. Figure 4A corresponds to the first 
stage  of  our  IV  strategy.  For  each  state,  we  run  a regression  of  the  degree  of  enforcement 
(measured by the log of number of inspections per firm in the city) on distance to the nearest 
enforcement office (measured in hours of travel by car). Each circle represents a coefficient of 
one of these regressions, which is plotted against the log number of inspectors per firm in the 
state. The size of the circle is the inverse of the standard error of the estimated coefficient. As 
expected,  all  coefficients  are  negative,  indicating  that  cities  located  away  from  enforcement 
offices  have  low  levels  of  enforcement.  More  importantly,  the  figure  shows  that  these 
coefficients are disproportionately more negative in states with lower endowments of inspectors. 
The slope of the regression line is positive and significant, as reported in the note of the figure. 
If  this  is  the  case,  we  would  expect  the  relationship  between  distance  and  the  labor 
market variables of interest, such as unemployment or informality, to be more pronounced in 
states  with  low  numbers  of  inspectors.  We  show  that  this  is  true  in  figures  4B  and  4C 
respectively, which correspond to the reduced form regressions of the outcome of interest on the 
instrument.  Again,  the  slopes  of  the  regression  lines  are  statistically  different  from  zero,  as 
reported in the note of the figure. In drawing Figure 4B, we started by regressing, for each state, 
the share of informal workers in each city in 2000 on the distance to the nearest enforcement 
office. Then we regress the estimated coefficient for each state on the log number of inspectors 
per firm in the state. For Figure 4C we do the same but we use the unemployment rate in the city 
in 2000 as the outcome of interest, instead of looking at the share of informal workers. All 
regressions are weighted by the inverse of the estimated variance of the coefficient. 
Figure 5 corresponds to two checks on the validity of our IV procedure. This procedure is 
valid if the effect of distance on labor  market outcomes does not vary across states (except 
through its effect on enforcement), or if this variation is not correlated with the number of state 
inspectors.  This  assumption  may  not  hold  if,  for  example,  those  cities  which  are  far  from   16 
enforcement offices are also small, rural, and remotely located, and if states with a large number 
of  inspectors  engage  in  active  regional  policies  favoring  small  and  remote  cities.  However, 
decisions about regional policy and about the number of inspectors per state are probably done 
by different institutions, and even at different administrative levels (state vs. federal). Moreover, 
for  reasons  discussed  above,  it  is  unlikely  that  inspections  were  important  for  labor  market 
outcomes before the 90s. Hence, we do not expect the relationship between distance and city 
level variables measured in 1980, such as the share of informal workers, or GDP per capita, to 
vary systematically with the number of inspectors in the state. Figures 5A and 5B document that 
this is indeed the case (we cannot reject that the slopes of the regression lines are equal to zero). 
Table 2 provides formal evidence that the interaction between the number of inspectors in 
the  state  and distance from  each  city  to  the  nearest  enforcement  office is uncorrelated  with 
several  city  level  variables  proxying  institutional  quality  or  different  dimensions  of  regional 
policy. One way to think about confounding interactions between other state characteristics and 
distance to large city centers on one side, and our instrument on the other, is to consider the role 
of state level policies to reduce regional inequality (associated with distance to large cities). One 
possibility is road construction, but since we measure distance to the nearest subdelegacia of the 
Ministry of Labor in travel time by car (not in miles), the quality of the road infrastructure is 
already accounted for. Since the transportation of goods in Brazil is done almost exclusively by 
train, we investigate whether the interaction of distance and state inspectors per firm affected the 
likelihood  of  each  city  to  have  a  train  station.  The  coefficient  is  negative  but  statistically 
insignificant.  Second,  we  checked  whether  enforcement  could  be  capturing  variation  in  the 
quality of other city institutions. If states with more inspectors per firm tried to minimize the 
impact of distance to focal cities on the access to institutions, this correlation would be present 
even after we instrument labor inspections. We proxy city level institutional quality using three 
indices: access to justice, governance, and political concentration. The empirical findings do not 
show evidence that this is a significant source of concern. 
Third,  we  look  at  city  level  inequality  in  social  infrastructure,  measured  by  the  log 
number of households with access to piped water, sanitation, and electricity (normalized by the 
number of individuals in the city). We find no correlation between the instrument and access to 
water and sanitation. There is a small correlation with access to electricity, but it has the opposite 
sign to what one would expect if it were capturing confounding variation in other state policies.   17 
Moreover, looking directly at the log of current transfers from states to cities (drawn from state 
tax revenues) per capita, we find no strong correlation between our instrument and this variable. 
Fourth, we assessed whether the instrument is correlated with the enforcement of other 
types of law, by looking at the number of homicides per 100,000 individuals in the city, and 
again we found no statistically significant effects. 
Fifth, the level of development of the state may itself be inequality reducing and could be 
correlated with the number of available inspectors per state. For example, in more developed 
states the quality of (private) transportation may be better so that roads are less of an obstacle, 
and goods and information may flow easily across cities (even if they are remote). This may 
affect the way economic activities are distributed across cities. The first thing to notice is that the 
instrument is not correlated with either city size (measured by log population) or log GDP per 
capita. More interestingly, when we use as the dependent variable the shares of GDP attributed 
to agriculture, industry and services, these are also not correlated with our instrumental variable. 
Therefore, the basic structure of economic activities in the city is not substantially affected by the 
variable we use to instrument enforcement, although (as we will show in the next section) the 
structure of the labor market will see some changes. 
Finally, we show that the instrument cannot predict past values of the main variables of 
interest in this paper: city level informality (the share of workers not paying social security), the 
unemployment rate, inequality (theil index), and the poverty rate measured in 1980. In sum, this 
table shows that the instrument is both theoretically plausible and empirically credible.
19 
Table 3 reports estimates for the coefficient on the instrument, and the average marginal 
effect of distance on enforcement. The relevant F-statistic measuring the strength of the first 
stage relationship is shown at the bottom of each column. Since we are using a large set of 
controls, for transparency we report three different specifications. In the first column we regress 
enforcement (measured by the log number of inspections per firm in the city) on distance to the 
nearest labor office (measured in travel time), its interaction with the number of labor inspectors 
per firm in the state (the instrument), and state fixed effects.  In the second column we add 
distance to the state capital and its interaction with state inspectors per firm. In the third column 
                                                 
19 One could think that the interaction term we emphasize is hard to identify in small samples, and that the findings 
in table 2 are solely due to imprecision. This is not the case. In appendix table A4 we show not only the coefficient 
on the interaction of distance and state inspectors, but also the coefficients on the interactions between distance and 
all the other state level variables, which we use as control variables in table 2. The only interaction term that is 
systematically unrelated with the dependent variables in table 2 is the one we use as an instrument for enforcement.   18 
we present the full specification. Across columns, the marginal effect of distance on enforcement 
is  negative,  and  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  of  distance  and  inspectors  in  the  state  is 
positive,  showing  that  the  effect  of  distance  is  smaller  in  states  with  more  inspectors.  The 
coefficient on this interaction is similar across columns, and the F-statistic is always high so 
there is no concern with the instrument being weak (Stock and Yogo, 2003). 
6. Empirical Findings 
6.1 Aggregate Labor Market Outcomes 
Table 4 reports least squares (panel A) and instrumental variables (panel B) estimates of the 
effect of log inspections per firm in the city on the share of informal workers (defined as those 
without a work permit and the self-employed), the head count poverty ratio, the unemployment 
rate, and the Theil inequality index in the city. The controls and instruments were described in 
detail in the previous section and are also described at the base of the table. The instrumental 
variable estimates shows that a one unit increase in the log of inspections per firm in the city 
(corresponding to a 1 standard deviation, or sd, increase) leads to a 15 percentage point (or pp), 
reduction  in  the  proportion  of  informal  workers  in  the  city  (corresponding  to  1  sd  of  that 
variable), a 9 pp (1.5 sd) increase in the unemployment rate, a 0.12 pp (1 sd) reduction in the 
Theil inequality index, and a 5 pp (0.25 sd) reduction in the poverty rate.  
The IV estimates are larger in absolute value than the OLS estimates.
20 This suggests that 
cities with more crime also have stricter enforcement, which could happen because inspection 
activities respond to reports, and these are more common in places with more violations of the 
law. Table A5 (in the appendix) shows that the findings in table 4 are robust to the inclusion of 
city  sectoral  composition,  average  firm  size  in  the  city,  and  additional  worker  variables  as 
controls, two variables which may be correlated with the structure of the labor market in the city.  
In  line  with  the  findings  in  Heckman  and  Pages  (2004),  our  results  show  that  strict 
regulation increases unemployment. Theoretically this can happen either because firms are more 
                                                 
20 It is not surprising that OLS estimates of equation (1) are biased, because inspections are triggered through 
(anonymous) reports of violations of the law. Furthermore, we can also show that enforcement is strongly related 
with almost all institutional variables in Table 2. Therefore, IV will be different from OLS. It is also possible that the 
effect of enforcement varies across cities, in which case the IV estimate is a weighted average of effects (e.g., 
Imbens and Angrist, 1994, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2006). Indeed, if we include in the model an interaction 
of enforcement with, for example, the share of informal workers in the city in 1980, we find that the effect of 
enforcement declines with the level of past informality in the city (result available on request from the authors).   19 
constrained or because more individuals start searching in the formal sector. On the other end, as 
emphasized by Freeman (2007), enforcement is also associated with a strong reduction in income 
inequality. Notice that the effect on the poverty rate is fairly small.  
6.2 Wages and the Distribution of Employment across the Formal and 
Informal Sectors 
While the results we just reported are interesting, a more detailed analysis of the labor market is 
needed  to  understand  the  mechanisms  behind  them.  This  section  investigates  the  effect  of 
enforcement on the quantities and prices in each sector of the labor market. In particular, we 
examine movements in the proportion of workers who are formal, informal, or self-employed, 
and in the distribution of wages for each of these groups. 
Table 5 reports the effect of enforcement on the share of the adult population in the city 
in each employment category, in 2000. In cities with stricter enforcement there is more formal 
employment,  more  non-employment,  and  less  self-employment.  There  is  no  statistically 
significant  effect  of  enforcement  on  the  number  of  informal  wage  earners.  If  workers  shift 
sectors in response to changes in enforcement, then the composition of workers in each sector is 
bound to be affected as well. In table 6 we estimate the effect of enforcement on the distribution 
of schooling for each type of workers. Each column refers to a different quantile of the schooling 
distribution,  which  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable  in  the  regressions.  The  table  shows  a 
statistically significant decrease in the education of formal workers, and a statistically significant 
increase  in  the  education  of  self-employed  individuals.  This  suggests  that  those  individuals 
leaving  the  self-employment  sector  to  join  the  formal  sector  come  from  the  bottom  of  the 
distribution of schooling in both sectors. 
As argued in section 3, mandated benefits will have differential effects across the wage 
distribution. Therefore, we study different percentiles of the wage distribution, as opposed to 
focusing only on the mean. Table 7 documents the effect of enforcement on wages. The top two 
panels correspond to the OLS and IV regressions we have been presenting so far in the paper. 
However, in light of the results of table 6, we present a third panel where we also control for the 
education of workers in each sector. For each quantile of the distribution of wages in the sector, 
we control for the corresponding quantile of the distribution of schooling in the same sector. 
Although it is unlikely that schooling is an exogenous variable in these regressions, we hope that 
this procedure allows to distinguishing true changes in wages from changes in the composition of   20 
workers. The findings show that an increase in enforcement is associated with a decline in wages 
at the top of the formal wage distribution, and an increase in wages among the self employed 
(with no statistically strong effect on the distribution of wages for informal wage earners). As a 
result,  there  is  a  fall  in  the  differential  between  the  wages  of  formal  and  informal  workers 
(although this result is not shown directly, it is available on request). These effects remain strong, 
though are slightly attenuated, once we control for changes in schooling across sectors.
21 
6.3. Interpretation  
Our results can be interpreted in light of the arguments sketched in section 3. An increase in the 
enforcement  of  mandated  benefits  in  the  formal  sector  leads  to  reduction  in  formal  wages, 
especially at the top of the distribution. Similarly, unemployment increases for two reasons. On 
the one hand, at the bottom of the formal wage distribution wages cannot adjust, and some 
employees are likely to be dismissed. On the other hand, if the fall in wages is smaller than the 
increase in the value of other formal job benefits (because of wage rigidity, or because the value 
workers put on benefits is higher than their cost to the firm), formal jobs become more attractive, 
inducing self-employed workers to search for work in the formal sector, in spite of a higher risk 
of unemployment.
22 If these jobs are at the bottom of the distribution of formal wages, it is 
natural that those workers leaving the self-employment sector have low levels of schooling.  
If the cost of mandated benefits to the firm is below the value they have to workers (e.g., 
tax free job severance payments, health and safety on the job), then an increase in mandated 
benefits  could  explain  a  rise  in  formal  sector  employment,  since  this  sector  becomes  more 
attractive. The contraction in the supply of self-employed workers causes an increase in their 
wages. Formal sector employment may also increase due to worker registration (through direct 
action of labor inspectors, or indirectly through a deterrent effect). 
                                                 
21 We estimate a simpler specification where the instrument for enforcement is distance alone, and not distance 
interacted with state inspectors. The reason this is not our main specification, we are not confident that distance 
alone is a valid instrument, although we conjecture that the bias should not be very large. The findings (not reported) 
show that, for most outcomes, the results are consistent with those reported in the paper. The main differences relate 
to income inequality, where coefficients are insignificant. Nevertheless, we still find a strong reduction on the 
formal wage premium, measured relatively to informal or relatively to self-employed workers. 
22 Using data from IPEA, we can compute the number of people searching for a job in each city, by subtracting the 
number of employed from the number of active individuals. The problem with this measure is that we cannot 
distinguish search in the formal and in the informal sector. If we regress the (log) number of individuals searching 
on enforcement (instrumented) we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in enforcement increases total 
search by 1/3 of a standard deviation.   21 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that there are no statistically significant effects neither 
on wages nor employment of informal wage earners. As suggested in the literature, they form a 
segmented branch of the labor market in Brazil, shielded from changes in the economy. 
We have ignored corruption so far. Increased enforcement may indicate more frequent 
corruption opportunities (not stricter regulation), especially for firms breaking the law. One way 
to model this is as an increase in the costs of hiring either formal or informal workers. However, 
corruption by itself cannot explain out data since it would imply a decline in wages in both 
sectors, and possibly a decline in employment in both sectors. 
6.4.  Inequality 
The empirical findings suggest that income inequality declines when enforcement increases. The 
second panel of table 7 shows a compression in the distribution of wages both in the formal and 
in the informal (self-employment) sectors. Moreover, there is a decline in wage differentials 
between formal and self-employed workers. However, we also have to consider that the non-
employment rate increases with enforcement, and this could lead to higher levels of city income 
inequality. The results in table 8 show that changes in non-employment are not uniform across 
the distribution of income. We consider 6 groups of individuals, according to their position in the 
distribution of household per capita income: 0-10 percentile, 10-25, 25-50, 50-75, 75-90, and 90-
100. Enforcement affects non-employment mostly for the poorest individuals in society, so it is 
not surprising that, in spite of the decline in inequality, we observe small decreases in poverty. 
Table 8 also shows that losses in employment are large among females, low skilled workers, and 
young workers, which are especially vulnerable groups (see also Heckman and Pages, 2004). 
In sum, these findings clearly show that it is difficult to reach the poor using labor market 
policy (we estimate small impacts of enforcement on poverty in table 4). The reason is that the 
poor are too much outside the margins of policy where regulation operates, echoing the results of 
several analyses of minimum wages (e.g., Almeida and Bourguignon, 2006). 
7. Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of an increase of enforcement of labor regulation on unemployment 
and inequality, using city level data from Brazil. We explore variation in the enforcement of 
labor market regulations using a new administrative dataset with information on the intensity of 
enforcement activity for all cities in Brazil. We interpret our findings in light of standard multi-  22 
sector models of the labor market in developing countries, which integrate formal and informal 
sectors and unemployment in a single framework. 
We find that an increase in enforcement leads to higher unemployment but lower inequality. 
We also document that: i) employment flows between the formal and self-employment sectors, 
but informal wage earners are in a segmented sector of the economy; ii) mandated benefits are 
borne by workers in the form of lower wages at the top of the formal wage distribution, but not at 
the bottom where downward wage rigidity may be important; iii) as a result, formal jobs at the 
bottom of the wage distribution become more attractive, inducing those who are low skilled and 
self-employed to search for employment in the formal sector. 
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Obs  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Inspected Firms per firm City  5,505 0.94 0.99 0.00 4.78
Log Inspectors per firm in the state 5,513 1.693 0.53 1.07 2.96
Distance to the nearest labor office (hours) 5,287 1.96 1.73 0.00 13.91
City distance to the State capital city (hours) 5,272 4.50 2.56 0.00 14.99
City transportation costs 5,495 5.89 0.78 0.39 8.69
City Latitude  5,507 -16 8 -34 5
City Longitude  5,507 46 6 32 73
City Altitude  5,507 412 293 0 1628
Log City Geografical Area 5,507 6.20 1.28 1.06 11.99
Access to Justice City   5,506 0.90 0.83 0.00 3.00
Governance City  5,505 3.17 0.91 1.00 5.85
Political Concentration City  5,504 0.23 0.10 0.07 1.00
Share Informal Workers City 5,507 0.74 0.17 0.22 1.00
Poverty Rate City 5,507 0.46 0.23 0.03 0.93
Unemployment Rate City 5,507 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.59
Theil Inequality Index City 5,507 0.52 0.11 0.19 1.27
Share Population Jobless 5,507 0.37 0.09 0.00 0.78
Share Population Formal Jobs 5,507 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.51
Share Population Informal Jobs 5,507 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.49
Share Population Self-Employed 5,507 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.70
Log wages in formal sector 5,497 5.93 0.35 3.69 7.65
Log wages in informal sector 5,507 5.73 0.42 4.47 7.38
Log wages self-employed 5,506 6.00 0.58 3.77 8.27
Log GDP per capita City 5,507 8.08 0.76 6.14 12.13
Log population City 5,507 9.36 1.11 6.68 16.16
Share migrants City  5,507 0.44 0.22 0.03 1.00
Log number firms City  5,505 5.09 1.52 0.00 13.05
Log Av. Firm size City  5,505 3.29 0.82 0.73 7.49
Share GDP Agriculture 5,492 0.29 0.19 0.00 0.86
Share GDP Manufacturing 5,507 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.95
Share GDP Services  5,507 0.52 0.16 0.03 0.97
Years schooling formal sector 5,504 6.18 1.42 0.00 11.16
Years schooling informal sector 5,507 5.29 1.39 1.52 10.80
Years schooling self-employed 5,506 4.45 1.59 0.32 10.29
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Labor (2002), Population census (2000), IPEA, IBGE. Table 2: City Characteristics and the Instrumental Variable
N. Obs Distance to the nearest labor office (hours) * 
Inspectors per firm in the state
(1) (2)
Train Stations City (dummy) 5,242           -0.025
[0.020]
Access to Justice City  5,244           -0.037
[0.041]
Managerial Capacity City 5,243           -0.035
[0.041]
Political Concentration City  5,243           -0.002
[0.004]
Households Piped Water pc City 5,242           -0.014
[0.041]
Households Sanitation pc City 5,242           -0.001
[0.078]
Households Electricity pc City 5,242           -0.02
[0.011]*
Current Transfers from State to City  4,518 0.044
[0.063]
Homicide Rate City 5,242           -0.067
[0.074]
Log Population City  5,242           -0.039
[0.032]
Log GDP pc City  5,242           0.022
[0.025]
Share Agriculture in GDP City  5,228           0.002
[0.007]
Share Manufactiring in GDP City 5,242           -0.007
[0.008]
Share Services in GDP City 5,242           0.006
[0.007]
Share Informal Workers City (1980) 5,242           -0.004
[0.005]
Unemployment Rate City (1980) 5,242           0.002
[0.001]*
Theil Index City (1980) 5,242           0.008
[0.006]
Poverty Rate City (1980) 5,242           0.002
[0.004]
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table reports the least squares
estimates of the regression of each of the variables reported at the top of each row on the distance to the nearest labor office (hours)
interacted with the log number of labor inspectors in the state. The controls are state dummies, distance to the nearest labor office, its
square and interactions with state level variables, distance to the state capital city, its square and interactions with the number of inspectors
per firm in the state and interactions with other state variables, city transportation costs, its square and interactions with the number of
inspectors per firm in the state and interactions with other state variables, city altitude, city latitude and city longitude. Other state variables
include average access to justice, political concentration, management quality in public administration and the GDP per capita in the state.
City transportation cost is the transport cost between each city and the nearest capital city in 1995. We also include the log of total
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Figure 2. Increase in the Cost of Mandated Benefits Valued 
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 Figure 4A: Effect of Distance on Enforcement Across Brazilian States
Figure 4B: Effect of Distance on Informality Across Brazilian States
Figure 4C: Effect of Distance on Unemployment Across Brazilian States
Note: In Figure 4A we run, for each Brazilian state, a regression of the degree of enforcement (measured by the log of number
of inspections per firm in the city in 2002) on distance to the nearest enforcement office (measured in hours of travel by car).
Each circle represents a coefficient of one of these regressions, which is plotted against the log number of inspectors per firm in
the state (coeff.=0.138, s.e.=0.029) . The size of each circle is the inverse of the standard error of the estimated coefficient.
Figures 4B and 4C can be interpreted analogously. Figure 4B plots the coefficients of a regression of the share of informal
workers (in 2000) in each city on distance, against the log number of inspectors per firm in the state (coeff.=-0.024,
s.e.=0.006), while Figure 4C plots the coefficients of a regression of the unemployment rate at the city level (in 2000) on
distance, against the log number of inspectors per firm in the state (coeff.=0.006, s.e.=0.002). Figure 5A: Effect of Distance on Past Informality Across States
Figure 5B: Effect of Distance City GDPpc in 1980 Across Brazlian States
Note: In Figure 5A we run, for each Brazilian state, a regression of the share of informal workers in the city in 1980 on
distance to the nearest enforcement office (measured by hours of travel by car). Each circle represents a coefficient of one of
these regressions, which is plotted against the log number of inspectors per firm in the state (coeff.=-0.015, s.e.=0.014). The
size of each circle is the inverse of the standard error of the estimated coefficient. Figure 5B can be interpreted analogously.
Figure 5B plots the coefficients of a regression of the GDP per capita in the city in 1980 on distance, against the log number of
inspectors per firm in the state (coeff.=0.009, s.e.=0.046). Table A1: Proportion of Labor Market Fines in the City (2002)
Obs  Average  SD 
(1)  (2) (3)
Worker's Formal Registration 1,453 0.22 0.31
Mandatoty Work Period 1,453 0.10 0.20
Mandatory Work Pause Period  1,453 0.09 0.17
Wage  1,453 0.09 0.18
FGTS Contributions  1,453 0.26 0.32
Other (incl. Health, Security Restrictions) 1,453 0.23 0.29
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Labor (2002)





Domestic worker with formal work permit  5,507 0.008
Domestic worker without formal work permit  5,507 0.025
Employee with work permit  5,507 0.137
Employee without work permit  5,507 0.163
Employer 5,507 0.015
Self-Employed  5,507 0.196
Unpaid apprentice 5,507 0.001
Unpaid employee 5,507 0.036
Worker self-consumption  5,507 0.046
No employment status  5,507 0.373
Source: Census (2000)
Table A3: Distribution of City Wages by Employment Status
Percentile 10  Percentile 50 Percentile 90
(1) (2) (3)
Formal Wage Earners  5.03 5.60 6.51
Informal Wage Earners  4.52 5.34 6.37
Self-employed 4.35 5.40 6.69
This table shows percentiles of the wage distribution for the formal wage earners, informal wage earners and self-employed, respectivley. Table A4: City Characteristics and the Instrumental Variable
N. Obs
Distance to the 
nearest labor 
office (hours) * 
Inspectors per 
firm in the state
Distance to the 
nearest labor 
office (hours) * 
Managerial 
capacity in the 
state
Distance to the 
nearest labor 
office (hours) * 
Access to Justice 
in the state
Distance to the 
nearest labor 
office (hours) * 
GDP pc in the 
state
Distance to the 
nearest labor 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Train Stations City (dummy) 5,242        -0.025 0.068 0.01 -0.10 -0.53
[0.020] [0.032]** [0.021] [0.032]*** [0.164]***
Access to Justice City  5,244        -0.037 -0.085 (0.01) 0.07 0.03
[0.041] [0.063] [0.047] [0.061] [0.317]
Managerial Capacity City 5,243        -0.035 -0.063 0.08 -0.01 0.35
[0.041] [0.068] [0.054] [0.062] [0.348]
Political Concentration City  5,243        -0.002 0.002 (0.01) 0.00 -0.02
[0.004] [0.007] [0.006]** [0.007] [0.045]
Households Piped Water pc City 5,242        -0.014 0.005 (0.15) 0.10 -0.01
[0.041] [0.078] [0.050]*** [0.070] [0.522]
Households Sanitation pc City 5,242        -0.001 -0.121 0.21 0.18 2.01
[0.078] [0.135] [0.116]* [0.129] [0.786]**
Households Electricity pc City 5,242        -0.02 -0.034 0.05 0.03 0.10
[0.011]* [0.017]* [0.014]*** [0.016]* [0.081]
Current Transfers from State to City  4,518        0.044 0.165 (0.15) -0.19 -1.21
[0.063] [0.084]** [0.061]** [0.070]*** [0.375]***
Homicide Rate City 5,242        -0.067 -0.056 0.22 -0.09 0.22
[0.074] [0.121] [0.088]** [0.127] [0.611]
Log Population City  5,242        -0.039 -0.116 (0.04) 0.04 0.52
[0.032] [0.055]** [0.036] [0.059] [0.306]*
Log GDP pc City  5,242        0.022 0.094 (0.02) -0.12 -0.46
[0.025] [0.047]** [0.033] [0.044]*** [0.243]*
Share Agriculture in GDP City  5,228        0.002 0.057 (0.01) -0.05 -0.15
[0.007] [0.011]*** [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.058]***
Share Manufactiring in GDP City 5,242        -0.007 -0.017 0.01 -0.01 -0.05
[0.008] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] [0.072]
Share Services in GDP City 5,242        0.006 -0.041 0.00 0.05 0.20
[0.007] [0.013]*** [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.067]***
Share Informal Workers City (1980) 5,242        -0.004 0 (0.02) 0.01 0.07
[0.005] [0.009] [0.006]** [0.009] [0.052]
Unemployment Rate City (1980) 5,242        0.002 0.002 (0.00) 0.00 -0.01
[0.001]* [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.009]
Theil Index City (1980) 5,242        0.008 -0.031 0.01 0.06 0.17
[0.006] [0.010]*** [0.008] [0.010]*** [0.052]***
Poverty Rate City (1980) 5,242        0.002 -0.012 0.01 0.01 -0.04
[0.004] [0.006]** [0.005]* [0.006]** [0.028]
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table reports the least squares estimates of the regression of each of the variables
reported in each row on the distance to the nearest labor office (hours) interacted with the number of labor after controlling for all the variables as in column (3) of table 4. Households
with piped water, sanitation and electricity are measured with the logarithm of number of households with these amenities normalized by the total number of individuals in the city. When
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Summary Findings
We study the effect of enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil, an
economy with a large informal sector and strict labor law. Enforcement
affects mainly the degree of compliance with mandated benefits
(severance pay; health and safety) in the formal sector; and the
registration of informal workers. We find that stricter enforcement leads
to higher unemployment but lower income inequality. We also show
that, at the top of the formal wage distribution, workers bear the cost of
mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. This is not true at the
bottom, because of downward wage rigidity. As a result, formal sector
jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution become more attractive,
inducing the low skilled self-employed to search for formal jobs.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK